

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MASERU IMMEDIATE

USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 292539 TOSEC 310371

NODIS

MASERU FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFFLE

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM GENEVA DATED NOVEMBER 30, 1976

SENT SECSTATE WASHDC IS REPEATED TO YOU: QUOTE

S E C R E T GENEVA 9552

NODIS

FOR AF/EDMONDSON FROM WISNER

DEPT PASS LONDON AND MASERU FOR AMB. SCHAUFFLE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR RH UK

SUBJ: RHODESIA CONFERENCE: CHONA'S VIEWS ON AN INTERIM
GOVERNMENT

1. DURING THE PAST TWO DAYS, I HAVE DISCUSSED AT
CONSIDERABLE LENGTH CHONA'S VIEWS ON THE FORMATION
OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. IN BRIEF, THEY COMPLIMENT
AMBASSADOR REINHARDT'S DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT
KUANDA (LUSAKA 3179) AND RICHARD'S DESCRIPTION OF
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CHONA'S OUTLOOK (GENEVA 9482). WITH SALIM OUT OF TOWN,

CHONA DOMINATES THE OBSERVER TEAM. GIVEN THE INFLUENCE HE ENJOYS WITH KUANDA AND THE KEY ROLE HE HAS PLAYED IN GENEVA (CHONA, YOU WILL RECALL, FIRST ADVANCED THE INDEPENDENCE DATE QUESTION) HIS VIEWS ON THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. IN SUMMARY, CHONA CALLS FOR AN ENTIRELY NEW FRAMEWORK FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH THE SALISBURY AUTHORITIES.

2. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S POSITION. ACCORDING TO CHONA, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS A FULLY DEVELOPED POSITION ON THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. ITS POSITION WAS WORKED OUT PRIOR TO NKOMO'S AND MUGABE'S ARRIVAL IN GENEVA AND HAS NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THAT TIME. THE FRONT FORESEES A ONE TIER GOVERNMENT WITH 25 MINISTRIES, OF WHICH 20 MINISTRIES WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE 4 NATIONALIST DELEGATIONS AND 5 MINISTRIES WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE BRITISH WHO WOULD BE EXPECTED TO DISPOSE OF THEM IN ANY WAY THEY SAW FIT. THE FRONT UNDERSTANDS THAT THE RHODESIAN WHITES - REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RHODESIAN FRONT AND THE EUROPEAN OPPOSITION - WOULD HOLD THESE PORTFOLIOS BUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALLOCATING THEM WOULD LIE WITH GREAT BRITAIN. THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WOULD BE UNDER THE OVERALL SUPERVISION OF A BRITISH RESIDENT COMMISSIONER. BRITAIN WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR: (A) PREPARING AND PASSING THE ACT OF INDEPENDENCE, (B) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (C) ORGANIZING THE DRAFTING OF A CONSTITUTION, (D) THE RHODESIAN ARMY AND POLICE.

3. I ASKED CHONA IF THIS PROGRAM ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, INCLUDING ZIPA IN MOZAMBIQUE. CHONA REPLIED THAT THE PROGRAM HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF MUGABE, NKOMO, IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF ZIPA AND OF THE 5 FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS. IF THIS PROGRAM WITH ACCEPTABLE MODIFICATIONS IS NEGOTIATED, THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS FELT THEY COULD MANAGE ANY MINORITY OPPOSITION WHICH UNCONTROLLED ELEMENTS OF ZIPA MIGHT OFFER. IN THIS REGARD, CHONA ARGUED, IT IS VITAL TO KEEP THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TOGETHER SINCE THE FRONT HAD A MONOPOLY OF NATIONALIST MILITARY SUPPORT AND WOULD BE THE ONLY

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POLITICAL GROUP CAPABLE OF MAKING SURE THAT ZIMBABWE WAS "TRULY LIBERATED." NEITHER MUZOREWA NOR SITHOLE COUNTED SINCE THEY DID NOT HAVE EQUIVALENT POWER. CHONE REFERRED TO MUZOREWA IN EXTREMELY DISPARAGING TERMS. HE CALLED MUZOREWA "POLITICALLY NAIVE AND STUPID." IT IS CHONA'S VIEW THAT MUZOREWA ENJOYS LITTLE OR NO SUPPORT OUTSIDE OF THE HIGHFIELD TOWNSHIP OF SALISBURY AND EVEN HIS SALISBURY POLITICAL

BASE IS QUESTIONABLE. SITHOLE HAS A GREATER CHANCE OF INCREASING HIS POPULAR SUPPORT BUT SINCE HE HAS "ALMOST NO FOLLOWING" IN ZIPA, HE WILL NEVER BECOME AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL FORCE.

4. THE KISSINGER PLAN. TO SWEETEN WHAT HE ASSUMED TO BE A BITTER PILL, CHONA REITERATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S PRAISES OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. HE PICKED UP IAN SMITH'S 24 SEPT SPEECH AND READ OUT THE FIVE POINTS. THE FIRST POINT, INDEPENDENCE AND MAJORITY RULE, HAD BEEN SETTLED NOW THAT THE PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE HAD AGREED FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES TO A DATE OF INDEPENDENCE. THE PRESENCE OF SMITH AND THE NATIONALISTS IN GENEVA MET THE SECOND POINT. JUMPING TO THE FOURTH POINT, CHONA NOTED THE BRITISH HAD AGREED TO FULFILL THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. CONCERNING POINT FIVE, THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WAS CERTAIN TO CALL FOR AN END TO SANCTIONS, AND GUERRILLA WARFARE, HE ADDED, WOULD CEASE WITH THE FORMATION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT - ESPECIALLY IF THAT GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

5. DROPPING OF COUNCIL OF STATE. ONLY THE THIRD POINT REMAINED IN DISPUTE. WITH REGARD TO AN AFRICAN MAJORITY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S PROGRAM FORESAW THIS EVENTUALITY. THE COUNCIL OF STATE, HOWEVER, WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE NATIONALISTS AS WAS RHODESIAN WHITE MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE AND LAW AND ORDER. CHONA SAID THAT FOLLOWING SMITH'S SEPT 24 SPEECH, ZAMBIANS HAD ATTEMPTED TO FIGURE OUT WHERE THE IDEA OF A COUNCIL OF STATE HAD ORIGINATED. THEY CONCLUDED THAT IDEA COULD NOT HAVE ORIGINATED WITH SMITH OR EVEN WITH THE AMERICANS BUT WITH THE BRITISH. CHONA SAID HE
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COULD UNDERSTAND WHY SMITH GRASPED AT THE IDEA, SINCE HE PROBABLY ANTICIPATED BEING FORCED TO CONCEDE FAR MORE, SUCH AS ACCEPTANCE OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR GENERAL. SINCE THE COUNCIL OF STATE WAS NOT INSERTED AT SMITH'S INSISTENCE, THE IDEA HAD NO REAL STANDING AND COULD THEREFORE BE DISMISSED. I COUNTERED BY REMINDING CHONA THAT WHATEVER HE THOUGHT ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT, IT HAD BEEN PRESENTED AND SOLD TO SMITH, AND KAUNDA HAD BEEN FULLY BRIEFED ON IT. IT COULD NOT THEREFORE BE DISMISSED OUT OF HAND. KAUNDA'S SEPT 27 LETTER HAD SHOWED HE HAD UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS AT STAKE. CHONA WAS ALSO REMINDED THAT WHAT WAS FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT WAS THE CONCEPT THAT WHITES WOULD HAVE MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION AND POWER-SHARING WITHIN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. IF ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS FOR WHITE RHODESIAN

INTERESTS AND RIGHTS WERE NOT REFLECTED IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, THERE COULD BE NO REALISTIC EXPECTATION OF SELLING A SETTLEMENT TO OUR OWN DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCY; TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS WHOSE CONTINUED COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL; OR TO THE WHITE RHODESIANS AND THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT, WHOSE ACCEPTANCE WOULD BE THE ACID TEST OF ANY AGREEMENT REACHED HERE.

6. CHONA SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH THE BRITISH WHOM HE SAID HAD FRANKLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE COUNCIL OF STATE WAS A "COSMETIC" IDEA DESIGNED TO GIVE THE "ILLUSION" OF SECURITY FOR WHITE INTERESTS WITHOUT THE SUBSTANCE. THE BRITISH, HE SAID, ARE ALREADY LOOKING TO POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES. MOREOVER, CHONA SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD EXPLICITLY BY "SMITH'S MAN" HERE IN GENEVA (UNNAMED) THAT, ALTHOUGH THE RHODESIANS WOULD MAKE THINGS VERY DIFFICULT AND EMBARRASSING FOR THE BRITISH IF IT WERE PROPOSED THAT THE COUNCIL BE DROPPED, THEY WOULD NOT IN THE END INSIST UPON IT. THE ROLE WHICH BRITAIN COULD PLAY DURING THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OFFERED AN ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR WHITE RHODESIAN BLOCKING FORCE DURING TRANSITION, AND CHONA'S RHODESIAN SOURCE AGREED. IF, IN ADDITION, BRITAIN TOOK RESPONSIBILITY FOR RHODESIA'S ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE, THE LAST DISPUTED ELEMENT COULD BE MANAGED.

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7. CHECKS AND BALANCES. I TOLD CHONA THAT IF ONE GOES TO THE HEART OF A MATTER, THE THIRD OF THE FIVE POINTS CALLS FOR A GOVERNMENT IN WHICH POWER WOULD BE SHARED BETWEEN WHITE AND BLACK RHODESIANS DURING THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION. THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, AS FORESEEN IN THE FIVE POINTS, WOULD PROVIDE CHECKS AND BALANCES WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN COMMUNITIES TO SETTLE DOWN IN REASONABLE HARMONY AND COME TO TERMS, ONE WITH THE OTHER. I TOLD CHONA THAT I ASSUMED THE EUROPEANS AS WELL AS THE AFRICANS NEEDED TO BE SURE DURING TRANSITION THAT NEITHER COMMUNITY COULD REVERSE THE SETTLEMENT AND THEREBY COMPROMISE A MODERATE AND STABLE OUTCOME. IF I UNDERSTOOD THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S PROGRAM AS CHONA HAD DESCRIBED IT, IT SEEMED TO CALL FOR INSTANT MAJORITY RULE AS OPPOSED TO POWER SHARING IN ANY FAIR DEFINITION OF THE TERM. WHILE I WOULD NOT QUARREL WITH THE BRITISH ASSUMING A REASONABLE DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR RHODESIAN AFFAIRS DURING TRANSITION, I WAS NOT SURE THAT SUBSTITUTING BRITISH FOR RHODESIAN POWER WOULD IN ANY SENSE BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SALISBURY AUTHORITIES. THE RECORD OF GENEVA TO DATE HAD BEEN ONE OF AFRICANS AND EUROPEANS ATTACKING

THE BRITISH. IT WOULD BE AN UNFORTUNATE STATE OF EVENTS IF THIS HABIT WAS CARRIED INTO THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. THE NATIONALISTS, I TOLD CHONA, COULD NOT BLANDLY ASSUME BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND SOUTH AFRICA WOULD PRODUCE IAN SMITH'S AGREEMENT TO A SETTLEMENT UNDER WHICH HE HAD BEEN DENIED THE SAFEGUARDS CONTAINED IN THE FIVE POINTS. ASKING US TO DO SO WOULD PUSH US BEYOND WHAT IS POLITICALLY POSSIBLE AND RISK A BREAKDOWN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HIS PRESIDENT HAS WORKED SO HARD TO AVOID.

8. CHONA REPLIED THAT WE SHOULD NOT LOOK FOR CHECKS AND BALANCES IN ANY FORMAL SENSE. UNDER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S PROGRAM, AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, THE RHODESIANS WOULD HAVE FIVE PORTFOLIOS IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE PERMANENT UNDERSECRETARIES IN EACH MINISTRY WOULD BE WHITE, AS WOULD ALL THE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE. THE MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES WOULD BE COMMANDED BY WHITE OFFICERS. (IN FACT, CHONA SAID
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THE ARMY AND THE POLICE WOULD BE RETAINED THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION AND ALL WHITE OFFICERS WHO TOOK AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE QUEEN WOULD BE RETAINED. ACCORDING TO CHONA, NKOMO AND MUGABE HAVE ACCEPTED THIS POINT.) THE ECONOMY WOULD BE IN EUROPEAN HANDS. BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW AND ORDER WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL POINTS OF REASSURANCE TO THE RHODESIAN POPULATION, WHICH CHONA FELT IS DEEPLY INTERESTED IN A RAPID SETTLEMENT. THE INTERREGNUM WILL BE A DANGEROUS PERIOD, CHONA ARGUED. IF RHODESIA IS TO SURVIVE THE DELEGATE 9 TO 12 MONTHS IN QUESTION AND MOVE ON TO INDEPENDENCE UNDER STABLE CONDITIONS, FORMAL POLITICAL CONTROL MUST LIE IN AFRICAN HANDS. TAKEN TOGETHER - EFFECTIVE RHODESIAN CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY AS WELL AS A BRITISH PRESENCE - SHOULD PROVIDE THE REAL CHECKS AND BALANCES THE FIVE POINTS ORIGINALLY ASSUMED.

9. DUNSTAN DAMANA, THE ZAMBIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND CHONA'S ASSISTANT IN GENEVA, SAID THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S ONE-TIER STRUCTURE WOULD PROVIDE FOR LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE GUARANTEES FOR THE WHITE RHODESIAN COMMUNITY. KAMANA HINTED THAT FOR MAJOR LEGISLATIVE ITEMS 19 OUT OF 25 MINISTERS WOULD HAVE TO AGREE BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER COULD TAKE ACTION. THE MAJORITY WOULD BE SMALLER FOR LESS SENSITIVE MATTERS. CHONA DID NOT EXPLICITLY ENDORSE KAMANA'S DESCRIPTION OF THE MINISTERIAL PROCESS BUT SAID THAT "CONVINCING"

GUARANTEES WOULD BE SPELLED OUT IN THE POSITION WHICH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL GIVE TO IVOR RICHARD. CHONA REJECTED ALL SUGGESTIONS OF AN ALTERNATIVE SECOND BODY TO THE COUNCIL OF STATE (E.G., A PRIVY COUNCIL) WHICH MIGHT EXERCISE VETO OR EVEN STRONG AND SUSTAINING ADVISORY POWERS IN CONJUNCTION WITH A BRITISH GOVERNOR GENERAL. HE WAS UNWILLING TO CONSIDER ANY ALTERNATIVE TO THE INTERIM STRUCTURE HE HAD OUTLINED.

10. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT, CHONA INSISTED, WAS NOT TO GIVE WHITE RODESIANS AN ILLUSION OF SECURITY WHICH WOULD LATER BE DESTROYED, THEREBY PERCIPITATING THE LOSS OF CONFIDENCE AND THE MASS EXODUS WE ALL SEEK
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TO AVOID. AN INTERIM STRUCTURE THAT WAS TOO COMPLICATED WOULD BE PARALYZED BY INTERNAL DISAGREEMENT AND THERE WOULD BE NO EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF POLITICAL POWER. IF THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT ACT, ZIPA WOULD. MOREOVER, THE ELABORATE TWO-TIER INTERIM STRUCTURE WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF GIVING WHITES CONFIDENCE IN THEIR FUTURE AFTER INDEPENDENCE. CHONA EVEN PUT FORWARD THE IDEA, WHICH HE SAID WAS BEING ADVANCED BY SOME ELEMENTS WITHIN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, THAT ELECTIONS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE SHOULD BE ABANDONED AND THE INTERIM STRUCTURE (OUTLINED ABOVE) ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN PLACE AFTER INDEPENDENCE. THIS, HE ARGUED, WOULD GIVE THE WHITES MORE PARTICIPATION IN THE POST INDEPENDENCE PERIOD THAN AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT, WHICH OTHERWISE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO SEE ANY WHITES IN MINISTERIAL POSITIONS. WHEN WE COUNTERED THAT THE ELECTIONS AT LEAST OFFERED THE RHODESIANS GREATER ASSURANCE OF AN ORDERLY TRANSITION THAN THE ARBITRARY AND INDEFINITE PERPETUATION OF THE INTERIM STRUCTURE, CHONA SAID HE NEITHER ENDORSED NOR WANTED TO DEFEND THE DROPPING OF ELECTIONS BUT MERELY WANTED US TO KNOW THAT IT WAS BEING CONSIDERED BY SOME ELEMENTS WITHIN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. CHONA SEEMED TO WANT TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT SMITH COULD STRIKE A LONG-TERM BARGAIN FOR THE WHITE COMMUNITY IF HE PLAYED HIS CARDS SMARTLY WITH THE FRONT AND THE PRESIDENTS.

11. IN CONCLUDING HIS REMARKS, CHONA DESCRIBED IN HISTORIC TERMS THE PRIDE WHICH ZIMBABWEANS, AFRICANS GENERALLY AND EVEN HE FELT ABOUT THE STRUGGLE OF THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS FOR ZIMBABWE'S LIBERATION. IN CHARACTERIZING THE STRUGGLE AS THE VINDICATION AND PURIFICATION OF 86 YEARS OF AFRICAN DEFEATS AT THE HANDS OF WHITE SETTLERS, MANY ZIMBABWEANS, CHONA SUGGESTED, BELIEVED THAT CONTINUING THE WAR MIGHT NOT BE SUCH A BAD OPTION AFTER ALL OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE FAILS TO PRODUCE AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT. THE UNITED STATES HAD

TO DECIDE WHICH RISK WAS GREATER - SMITHS TERMS WITH
A SETTLEMENT OR CONTINUED WARFARE.

12. COMMENT: CHONA BARELY DISGUISES THE FACT THAT HE
IS REWRITING HISTORY. I REVIEWED THE HISTORICAL RECORD
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OF OUR CONSULTATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH KAUNDA IN
SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO LEAVE NO DOUBT IN CHONA'S MIND THAT
I WAS AWARE OF HIS DISTORTIONS OF WHAT ACTUALLY
TRANSPIRED. CHONA DISGUISED ONLY THINLY THAT THE OUT-
COME HE NOW ENVISAGES IS ONE THAT WOULD GIVE SMITH,
MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE ONLY A SYMBOLIC ROLE IN THE INTERIM
GOVERNMENT. HE IS CLEARLY PLAYING FOR A SOLUTION THAT
GIVES THE PATRIOTIC FRONT A CONVINCING AND COMMANDING
POSITION. FINALLY, CHONA MADE NO EFFORT TO HIDE THE
FACT THAT THE COURSE HE OUTLINED INVOLVES
A COMPLETE REDEFINITION OF THE GENEVA FRAMEWORK AS IT
CONCERNS THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT.

13. DISTRESSED THOUGH WE SHOULD BE AT CHONA'S DEVIOUSNESS,
WE SHOULD MAKE NO MISTAKE THAT HIS VIEWS ARE TO BE TAKEN
SERIOUSLY AND THAT HE IS DEFINITELY A FACTOR TO BE DEALT
WITH. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT HE (IF NOT THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT) HAS FIXED THESE CONCLUSIONS FIRMLY AND IS PUSHING
THEM. IF THE SCENARIO OF THE DEBATE OVER THE INDEPEN-
DENCE DATE ISSUE IS ANY GUIDE FOR THE FUTURE, WHAT WE
ARE NOW WITNESSING IS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, IN CONSULTATION
WITH THE FRONT LINE OBSERVERS AND ANYAOKU REPRESENTING THE
NIGERIANS, CAREFULLY PREPARING THEIR POSITION ON THE IN-
TERIM GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE. WE MAY AS WELL ASSUME THAT
THE DIRECTION CHONA IS TAKING WILL SOONER OR LATER
BECOME, IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY, THEIR CONSOLIDATED POSITION;
AND WHEN THE DEBATE OPENS, IT WILL NOT BE JUST THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT AGAINST THE THREE OTHER DELEGATIONS
BUT THE FRONT PLUS FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE NIGERIANS.
MOREOVER, ONCE THE DEBATE HAS BEGUN, THE FRONT LINE
STATES WILL BE AS MUCH A PART OF THE PROBLEM AND AS
DISTANT FROM THE SOLUTION AS THEY WERE DURING THE
DEBATE ON THE DATE ISSUE.

14. WHEN CHONA TALKS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING
THE INTEGRITY OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, HE MAY REALLY
BE REFERRING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE UNITY
OF THE FRONT LINE STATES. THE RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS
BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN NKOMO AND MUGABE HERE IN
GENEVA MAY ALSO REPRESENT THE BASIS FOR THE RECONCILI-
ATION OF THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS
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OVER WHO SHOULD HOLD THE REIGNS OF POWER. THE ZAMBIANS, APART FROM THEIR UNRESERVED DISLIKE FOR MUZOREWA, WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO SEE NKOMO IN POWER, AND PRESIDENT KHAMA NO DOUBT SHARES THIS VIEW. IT CAN PROBABLY BE ASSUMED THAT NYERERE AND MACHEL WOULD PREFER TO SEE MUGABE AND ZIPA IN CONTROL, PROBABLY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THIS WOULD GIVE THEM GREATER INFLUENCE OVER ZIMBABWE'S FUTURE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DIRECTION. THE PRESENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NKOMO AND MUGABE - WITH NKOMO AS THE SENIOR PARTNER, BUT WITH MUGABE STILL HAVING COMMANDING INFLUENCE - IS THEREFORE A COMPROMISE ARRANGEMENT, AND PERHAPS THE ONLY ONE, THAT ALL FIVE PRESIDENTS CAN ENDORSE AND SUPPORT. MOREOVER, THE UNITY OF THE FRONT ALSO MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR KAUNDA, AT LEAST, TO FEEL IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO OFFER THE ASSURANCE THAT THE PRESIDENTS CAN AND WILL END THE FIGHTING ONCE A SETTLEMENT IS REACHED.

15. FINALLY, I AM CONVINCED THAT IT WAS NOT WITHOUT PURPOSE THAT CHONA RAISED THE IDEA OF DISPENSING WITH ELECTIONS AND ALLOWING THE INTERIM STRUCTURE, WITH WHITE PARTICIPATION, TO REMAIN IN PLACE AFTER INDEPENDENCE. HE MAY WANT US TO HINT TO SMITH THAT HE MAY FIND A LONG-TERM ACCOMMODATION AND GREATER SECURITY BY EMBRACING THE FRONT AND ACCEPTING ITS PROPOSALS.

16. CHONA IS CLEARLY LOOKING TO US TO REACT TO HIS PROPOSAL. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE THE ABSOLUTELY FIRM STAND THAT POWER SHARING MEANS POWER SHARING, THAT THERE MUST BE EFFECTIVE CHECKS AND BALANCES WITHIN THE INTERIM STRUCTURE, AND THAT THESE CANNOT BE REPLACED BY VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS PROMISES OR UNDERSTANDINGS THAT ULTIMATELY WILL NOT PASS MUSTER WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS OR WITH SMITH. IF WE FAIL TO MAKE THESE POINTS, CHONA MAY GET THE SIGNAL THAT HE IS OBVIOUSLY LOOKING FOR, NAMELY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE IN THE COURSE HE INTENDS TO PURSUE. WE WILL BE DRAFTING TOUGH TALKING POINTS FOR AMBASSADOR REINHARDT FOR HIS USE. IN PARTICULAR, WE INTEND TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE WILL TAKE NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR SELLING ANY SETTLEMENT TO SMITH AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT DOES NOT

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BEGIN WITH THE FIVE POINTS AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION AND DOES NOT INCLUDE CLEARLY DEFINED SAFEGUARD MECHANISMS WITHIN THE INTERIM STRUCTURE. ANY THOUGHTS

YOU HAVE WOULD BE APPRECIATED.CATTO UNQUOTE ROBINSON

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